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THE INTRUSIONS OF SCIENCE 
I t is not infrequently related that human arrogance was sadly 
but not unjustly rebuked by Darwin and the evolutionary science 
of the Nineteenth Century. And indeed from the point of view 
of pure science there was arrogance in an assumption that the 
enveloping intelligence of the universe looked upon mankind as its 
terminus ad quem to which all parts were subordinate--in an 
assumption that men were made in the likeness of an over-ruling 
power that worked by ways which, paradoxically, even that 
likeness was fain to call mysterious and incomprehensible. 
Science seemed to make these ways less mysterious, less incom-
prehensible; but the price paid was a fall of that pride of place. 
The biological continuity of man in the hierarchy of the beasts 
that perish was a little hard to bear, and it had to be borne. 
And yet, now that we are able to pause, and look back upon 
the half-century in which science has outlived the astonishment 
it created, the advantage it had on the ground of its humility 
appears to have been indeed only verbal. It would be hard to 
find a humility more arrogant than Clifford's, more self-assertive 
than Haeckel's, more truculent than Spencer's. 
"We conclude, then," says Spencer at the end of his famous 
essay, What Knowledge Is of Most Worth? "that for discipline as 
well as for guidance, science is of chiefest value. . .. To the 
question-What knowledge is of most worth?-the uniform reply 
is-Science. . .. For the due discharge of parental functions 
the proper guidance is to be found only in-Science. For the 
interpretation of national life, past and present, without which 
the citizen cannot regulate his conduct, the indispensable key is 
-Science. Alike for the most perfect production and highest 
enjoyment of art in all its forms the needful preparation is still 
-Science. And for the purposes of discipline--intellectual, 
moral, and religious-the most efficient study is once more--
Science." 
And if we should look, as we might have looked any time 
these fifty years, into the psychology of that surprising intellect-
ual revolution, we could find a self-satisfaction no less towering in 
those men whose talk was of fossils, of carbon, of mammals, and 
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of evolution, than in those whose talk was of virtue, of wisdom, 
and of the discourse of reason. For human arrogance hardly 
dwells in the object of pride, but rather in the human conscious-
ness. In both cases the pride was the pride of accomplishment, 
the pride of discovery, the pride of having adjusted and trained 
the mind to the grasp of valuable truths. It was, I dare say, 
as purely a self-satisfaction when the subject of discourse was 
objective scientific data as when it was the human spirit itself. 
The significant thing, however, is not the distribution of in-
vidious terms, but rather the recognition of an important truth of 
which this arrogance is the curiously decisive witness. For this 
arrogance, whether of scientist or humanist, bears evidence that 
human knowledge, scientific or humane, attains its only import-
ance through the estimate put upon it by the human conscious-
ness. Arrogance is but an expression of the estimate. Science, 
however, seemed long to forget, in its own preoccupation with 
the external world, that this was an activity of the consciousness 
-this decision that science was momentous. It seemed long 
to forget that it owed its own importance to the approval of that 
consciousness. It seemed long to forget, that is, that it itself 
was humbly subordinate-that the judicial consciousness was 
the superior. 
No doubt there was great attraction in the first promises of 
science. I t seemed to offer hope of an ultimate philosophy of 
life. The conception of hierarchies of laws leading to a universal 
law seemed at last to give assurance of that resting-place that the 
human spirit craved beyond all things. The mystery of life was 
solved, so science seemed to whisper. What a seductive whisper 
to one whose spirit was wearied with the baffling search after an 
order that as yet seemed to be but faintly coagulating in the 
structureless fluidity of human life. It was possible in the rapt 
contemplation of that hypothetic spectacle to forget for a time 
its bearing, its whole implication, as it is always possible in the 
presence of grandeur to be for a time wholly self-forgetful. But 
the mountain dweller soon finds the magnificence of his view 
insufficient to satisfy all the needs of his being. Life must go on, 
and the spectacle stales. Our interest in life is more than spec-
tacular, though a spectacle may enrapture us for a moment. In 
the end we find that our interest comes back to humanity. Even 
our gratification at the spectacle is a gratification of our own 
spirits and significant only because our own spirits are gratified. 
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What other end, when at last we recover from the intoxication of 
that self-forgetful moment, and inquire calmly into the bearings 
of the situation-what other end is imaginable? Who else is to 
be pleased, helped, served, made better, made happier? When 
we hunt down all the criteria by which the worth of things is 
ultimately established we find them homing at last to the human 
spirit. The scientific revolution of the second half of the Nine-
teenth Century was essentially a moment of intoxicated self-
forgetfulness. 
Though the present moment is not without signs of a sober 
return to the fuller concerns of life, yet our intellectual inherit-
ance of to-day is still representative of the mood of rapt wonder. 
That mood was strong enough, and definite enough in its point 
of insistence, to have got itself heard above the other voices of 
the time. Once dominant it had in its power the means of per-
sistence; it commanded the training of the new generation of 
intellect. There is something to be said for the splendid mili-
tancy of the earlier ge~eration of scientific controversialists-
for the Huxleys and Tyndalls of the first decades of the revolu-
tion. They were not themselves, without some sense of the 
valuable points in the attitude they were opposing. That they 
bore so heavily upon their own end of the beam was due to the 
dead weight upon the other. But they were taken surprisingly 
at their word; there was a great shift of weight-perhaps dead 
weight-and the balance was overthrown. The newer genera-
tion of scientists, however, born and bred under the scientific 
regime, has not, naturally enough, had a keen sense of other 
than scientific values, not having been informed of them. The 
very momentum of their propaganda has been sufficient to keep 
them preoccupied, to keep them from inquiring too minutely 
into the ultimate bearing of their philosophy. Success has bred 
success. Contemporary honour, popular confirmation and en-
couragement arising out of the industrial situation, and the 
establishment of an imposing material equipment in every seat 
of learning have all tended to make for an unquestioning accept-
ance of the scientific dogma. 
The attitude of the new generation of scientists, who fell heir 
to the earlier conquests is not without psychological interest. 
Their training has been wholly a training of the intellect. The 
whole liturgy of the scientific service has been made up of varia-
tions upon the theme of minute care untiring patience, infinite 
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pains, to the end of absolute accuracy. The preoccupations of 
science have been with material things-things so definite that 
such accuracy is approachable if not really attainable. Indeed 
the whole ideal of scholarly procedure attained in science is one 
of the noteworthy accomplishments of the period. But the 
reaction of such exclusive attention to definite and tangible 
things has been curious. Perhaps the scientific inheritors are 
the victims of the said perfunctoriness which follows success, 
and follows the more quickly the less protracted the struggle, 
and falls the more inevitably upon those who are bred in estab-
lished tenets and accept them as a matter of course rather than 
as a matter of deliberate judgment. However that may be, the 
thoroughness with which their training has ignored the humane 
aspects of life and the thoroughness with which it has inculcated 
the virtue of absolute accuracy, has taught them to mistrust the 
exercise of the intellect in those humane fields where the data are 
less tangible than material things. 
Beside the apparent pride of the humanist, there were other 
coincidences in the scientific revolution that lent a verbal if not 
a real colour to the contrasts of which science was able to avail 
itself. Literature was ever the humanist's theme, and the human-
ist's mode of expression, the object of his concern, and the ground 
of his discipline. And literature-that term, alas, that covers 
so much that is mean and paltry and unworthy, as well as much 
that is great and noble-had come, fittingly to the scientist's 
dialectic purpose, to cover something that would be hard to 
defend from any point of view. Romanticism had done much 
to spread the conception that literature was, not a matter of 
intellect dealing with life, but a matter of sensuous pleasure, of 
resthetic enjoyment. 
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,-that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know," 
sang Keats; and the scientist of intellectual vigour could well feel 
assured that if the end of literature were a mere dallying with the 
emotions, a mere titillation of the sensibilities, he for one could 
not subscribe to that creed as sufficient for his guidance in the 
more serious business of life. The great names of Wordsworth 
and Shelley could do nothing to win his respect for literature, or 
make him critical of his master, Spencer, when he pronounced 
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literature a play activity. There was little enough in the litera-
ture or the literary judgment of his time to counteract the ten-
dency to mistrust the exercise of the intellect in the humane field. 
Of other literature he knew little or nothing. His formal 
training did little or nothing to acquaint him with it, and little 
to make him understand its point. His tastes hardly sent him 
to it; rather he was prone to accept the word and the spirit of 
Spencer as indicative of the proper scientific attitude; "Never 
stopping to ask what has been thought about this or that matter, 
I have usually gone direct to the facts as presented in Nature"; 
--or again, with respect to Plato: "Time after time I have been 
tempted to read, now this dialogue and now that, and have put 
it down in a state of impatience with the indefiniteness of the 
thinking." The indefiniteness of the thinking! Put to it, the 
humanist could hardly point to more definite thinking in his own 
field than Plato's; and if that were the case the scientist felt that 
he could hardly think well of the humane field as a place for 
intellectual exercise. All in all he found little to alter his precon-
ception that the serious intellectual concern of life was scientific, 
and that literature was a matter of play. 
To such a conclusion he was further predisposed by some-
thing deeper than these external influences. He became, himself, 
in his human relations, a thorough-going romanticist. It is the 
quality of the romanticist that he values supremely the intensity 
of certain of his emotions. Finding that the exercise of his 
intellect is not in itself conducive to the exaltation of these 
feelings, but rather that its tendency is to guard and restrain 
them, he is inclined to think of the intellect as a harsh, unwar-
ranted restriction upon their supreme spontaneity. So felt 
Rousseau; so felt Wordsworth; and so, in effect, has felt the 
romantic temperament in all times. It is needless to say, there-
fore, that the romanticist has chosen as the field of his indul-
gences those themes that are most prolific of emotion-human 
relations. Where he has concerned himself with things it ha~ 
been wholly in the search for beauty. Now it would seem that 
the scientist, whose whole serious preoccupation has been intel-
lectual, would be perhaps the last to fall int0 the ways of the 
romanticist. But the peculiarities of his training have been of a 
kind but ~lightly to interfere with his falling into those ways. 
He oos eschewed the exercise of his reason among data less tangi-
ble than things; his hard-headedness has confined itself largely 
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to things to which the romanticist is indifferent. There is little, 
therefore, to keep him from being romantic in the romantic field. 
On the face of it, it might seem probable that the scientist's 
training would leave him hard-headed in every relation of his 
life. But there are circumstances which interfere with such 
universal hard-headedness. The intellect is not spontaneous = 
it is a faculty, as the scientist knows, dependent for its value upon 
specific training. The test of its value is exterior to the thinker 
himself; its test is truth, and the thinker succeeds or fails as he 
attains to a measure of truth. Propound to a chemist the prob-
lem of analysing a/given fluid, and though he may take pleasure 
in the operation, the test of his success lies not in the pleasure 
but in the degree to which his report corresponds to the reality. 
It is externally measurable, and is of value as it is found by others 
to be true. Truth can be attained only by knowledge and train-
ing among the specific data involved in the problem. Hard-
headedness is therefore the fruit of specific training, and is 
perfected only in the matters in which it has been trained. 
With the romantic emotions, however, all this is different. 
Their end is the pleasure of their own exercise. The final test 
of their success is internal to each individual and then only as to 
his own. There is no external standard to which he must attain 
or fail. Of two lovers of art sitting in silent rapture before a 
Madonna of Raphae1's who shall judge of the more perfect 
attainment of the romantic aim. Each is the measurer of his 
own success. If each has thrilled to his utmost, that is as much 
as can be said. But which utmost is greater no one can say. 
And such perfect success is open to all, since the emotions are 
spontaneous, the fruit of indulgence, not the fruit of discipline. 
The point of such a discrimination is that the scientist is not, 
by virtue of his intellectual training, excluded from high romantic 
privileges in fields where his intellect is not disciplined. The 
romanticist may be a romanticist pure and simple, and avoid the 
scientific subject matter; but the scientist cannot be a scientist 
pure and simple, and the one subject matter that he cannot 
avoid is the romantic subject matter. He may, in effect, leave 
his disciplined intellect behind when he wanders into strange 
places; but he can never leave his common humanity behind. 
And here in the realm of his common humanity he cannot leave 
behind his inheritance of sensations, tastes, appetites, emotions, 
his desire for happiness. His perfected hard-headedness is not 
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scientifically applicable here. And because here in the midst of 
his inevitable human relations the type of reason that is applic-
able has not been specifically disciplined, and because here the 
emotions are most prolific, his tendency is to be a romanticist 
in the humane field. 
All this is but to apply the scientist's own principle of special-
isation. To the trained doctor the empirical practitioner is an 
abhorrence; to the scientist the lay dabbler is a subject of disgust. 
The mere impressionism of the amateur could never have at-
tained to the atomic theory, the ionic theory, or the discovery 
of bacteria and antitoxins. It is, therefore, far from illogical 
to apply the same principle to the human problem. The scientist 
can indeed endeavour to escape the taint of amateurism, of roman-
ticism' by the plea that in human affairs he is a human being, 
and by virtue of his common humanity is inherently fit for wise 
counsel and wise action. But he cannot in truth escape the 
sense that in such a plea he is denying the logic of his own scientific 
position, and allying himself with those impressionists in science 
whom he so justly despises. He cannot quite blind himself to 
the realisation that life, if left to the casual impressionism of the 
untrained, would never have attained to whatever degree of 
nobility men have brought it to. 
Such an arraignment is indeed ungracious, or must seem so 
to those who feel a sting of reproach in the term" romanticism." 
That the world owes an incalculable debt to science is a truism 
that goes without question. Medireval speculation over prob-
lems of the physical universe are as laughable to-day as a sopho-
more's. Science has done much to fight in its own field the 
vicious obscurantism that has survived from the Middle Ages. 
To know the things about which speculation is sophomoric is 
something; to have disciplined a generation in a knowledge of 
such things is much. None the less science has not won the 
whole intellectual battle, and to suggest the insufficiencies of 
science and of the scientific discipline is but to carry farther the 
very service which it has so effectively rendered to a single part 
of life and thought. It is but to assert the value of a rational 
discipline for that part of life which science must ignore, and 
with which to-day romanticism is making such havoc. 
And yet, in the curious but not incomprehensible blindness 
which we all experience in matters with which our eyes are 
familiar but into which our minds have not been taught to pene-
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trate, the man of science is 10th to admit just the element in the 
human field which is the determinant of all that is of moment 
there. Had he and his revolution fallen upon an age when that 
aspect of life in which he was untrained was in the hands of its 
own proper guardians, he might have found, in the culture of 
educated men, in the literature which the time elevated to the 
general respect, in the scholarship and criticism of his colleagues, 
a force to counterbalance his instinctive tendencies toward loose 
impressionism when he wandered from home. Instead, he fell 
upon a period in which not only had the human garden been let 
run wild, but in which all the traditional oracles to which men 
looked for wisdom praised wildness as the form proper to gardens. 
Dionysus was enthroned; and though many sang in the name of 
Apollo, they were in truth but wreathed Bacchre. The roman .. 
ticists were the spokesmen for all that part of life that lay beyond 
the range of his trained competence. They had captured litera-
ture, and with it all those quiet voices that spoke to him in 
moments of seclusion and contemplation. They had captured 
education, and with it those voices that bent his pliant spirit in 
its youth. They whispered nothing to him of a discipline of that 
spirit; they whispered nothing to him of a field of austere thought 
that comprised all great literature, and dealt with matter larger, 
and to humanity immeasurably more important, than the science 
of things; they whispered to him only subtle flatteries of his own 
innate instincts-seductive flatteries that drew his thoughts from 
the presence there of an element that was the most momentous 
element of all. 
There were other flatteries, less subtle, addressing themselves 
to the more rational part of his nature, which did little less to 
seal the scientist's content with the segregation of his intellectual 
life. He saw those whose avowed intellectual concern was with 
human experience hastening to enlist themselves under the 
banner of science. He saw erstwhile humane scholars comporting 
themselves strangely, though to him not strangely, in their 
desire to appear in the current scholarly fashion, imitating the 
scientific gait and manner; and more importantly, proclaiming 
the objective point of science to be their own objective point. 
Such imitation could do little but confirm him in his sense that 
the one mode of thought capable of worthy results was the one 
of his own predilection. 
It was not, indeed, that he thought of intellect as havi~ no 
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place in the ordering of human relations, but that he saw those 
relations gathering under the wing of sociology-a branch of 
scholarship that promised to care for them in the name of science. 
He could, it is true, lift questioning brows in the presence of a 
science so indefinite in its data as to be capable of no reliable 
generalisation. Yet he could look with tolerance, even with 
sympathy, at its endeavours to do its best with matter so unsys-
tematised, so various, so incalculable as humanity. If the 
matter was to be dealt with, that was the manner in which 
results were to be attained. With a little more discriminating 
scrutiny, however, than he was quite prepared to give it, and a 
little more humour than he was accustomed to apply to the objects 
of his serious preoccupation, he might have smiled at its solemn 
proposal to deal with humanity as its subject, and its prompt 
exclusion from that subject of the very element that made it 
human. 
To make a merit of excluding Hamlet from the play is but 
sorry fun for the spectators, however much it may simplify the 
problem of acting for the players. The sociologists, however, 
little enough aware of the subtler values that qualify the human 
outlook, saw no humour in their exclusions, saw nothing but grim 
necessity driving them, if they would deal with humanity after 
the manner of science, to cast overboard all the incalculable 
factors of thought and genius that have elevated mankind to the 
possibility of even sociological pursuit. They have not, even 
to-day, naturally enough, been able to sink all such contraband 
cargo, but they have done pretty well. They have largely 
limited themselves to savages, barbarians, and ihe least intelligent 
strata of civilised society; and though even these simple peoples 
have contraband qualities they have succeeded not badly in 
bringing them through under friendly labels. None the less, 
by narrowing their field they have pretty well evaded the confu-
sion that would arise from an attempt at scientific treatment of 
that surprising, spontaneous, incalculable element in men which 
at its highest we call genius and which in its lower degrees char-
acterise5 every man's conscious actions. For the accredited 
scientist, however, with his predisposition to think of the reason 
as trustworthy only when dealing with tangible, calculable data, 
sociology has done much to quiet whatever lurking sense may 
have troubled him ~f a need to take care of a part of life which 
humanly he could not ignore. 
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If he had, with orthodox scientific doubt, still been left un-
quiet in his mind by a glimpse of the insufficiency, the funda-
mental evasion, of the sociologists, his lingering questions might 
have been stilled by the eagerness with which another class of 
scholars in the field of human experience gave up their older 
methods as unfruitful, and allied themselves to his forces, with 
every confirmation that specifically trained intellect could give 
of the sufficiency of the scientific mode to deal with the human 
problem. Sociology was new; it was without traditions; it was 
a product of science itself. And moreover it might logically 
claim for itself simply those aspects of humanity that fell short 
of the humanising qualities of thought and genius. History, 
however, was anciently established, had its origin in humane 
impulses, and had long-established traditions. Still more 
importantly its subject matter was almost exclusively that 
human experience that had been moulded by the very thought 
and genius which sociology so selectively eschewed. History 
was predominantly the history of civilisation, not of savagery 
and barbarism, and one important branch of history was the 
biography of men whose only distinction from other men lay in 
the quality of their spontaneous genius. It was patent, there-
fore, to the scientist that here at least was a body of trained 
scholars whose subject was not exclusively one aspect of life, 
but was life as it has been lived, and life as it has been significantly 
lived. With his strong inherent sense that life as it is commonly 
lived is an amateur affair, his lingering sense that perhaps it 
needed intellectual direction could hardly fail of satisfaction at 
the accession of the historians. The spectacle of that shift to 
the scientific ideal and the scientific method, that ideal and that 
method which had come to mean to him the difference between 
chaos and order, was but a promise that at last something was to 
be done to orient the chaos by those whose concern for it was 
most serious and whose competence was most established. 
More amazing, if anything, than the historians and still more 
confirmatory of the modern attitude, are the scientific scholars 
in the field of literature. And yet there are conditions in the 
field of literary scholarship which make it a fair question whether 
the subject of that scholarship is not even less susceptible than 
history and sociology to the scientific mode of treatment. 
Science itself is not, indeed, uniformly scientific. We may-
to be for the moment wholly elementary-watch the sciences 
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shading off from one to another as they grow less and less accurate 
in their powers. And we may witness a progressive attempt to 
evade the less calculable elements that disturb the reliability of 
their generalisations, and a disposition to fall back upon the 
more definite sciences. Mathematics we speak of as the exact 
science because its data are controllably definite and ideally 
stable. Astronomy, physics, and chemistry are next and tend 
to become more and more mathematical. N ext stands biology; 
and here the scientist begins to be troubled by an incalculable 
element; a given amceba does not act so calculably as a chloride 
or a ray of light; it may surround and not irritably repel a grain 
of inorganic matter. But the biologist is not concerned with 
the spontaneous individuality of his amceba; he deals with its 
internal unconscious reactions, and reduces these more and more 
to matters of chemistry and physics and mathematics. Even 
when he comes to man he limits himself to those same internal 
calculable facts that make up human anatomy, histology, embry-
ology, physiology, and related sciences. He would shift the less 
calculable elements to, let us say, the sociologist. 
The sociologist nominally accepts them; but he again divides 
his human material into two classes-on the one hand those in 
whom the incalculable elements are comparatively low, and who 
live so close to the immediate demands of physical life that in 
the mass and on the average their actions may with some degree 
of accuracy be predicted; and on the other hand those among 
whom the intelligence is high enough to lift them above an exclu-
sive attention to the demands of physical life. Among these 
latter the characteristic activities are so far determined by the 
genius of its leaders and the ideas that they propagate that it is 
impossible to reduce to laws the actions and reactions of the 
mass. And so the sociologists have limited themselves con-
sciously or unconsciously to the former class, and shifted the latter 
to the care of some one else. History accepts what is, scien-
tifically speaking, too incalculable for sociology. History is 
primarily the history of civilisation. Now it is the very quality 
of civilisation that it is the addition built by the spontaneous 
genius of men upon the substratum of instinctive animal life. 
It is true, however, that the historian must take into account 
both the superstructure and the substratum. Both are jmportant 
in determining the development of a people however civilj sed. 
It is to be admitted, therefore, after watching the gradations of 
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~cience to the less and less definite, that there remains over for 
history an element that relates it, however remotely, to the 
skirts of science. Its main subject is something else, something 
not so calculable, but it has this calculable element attached 
to it though in a wholly subordinate way. 
Literature is trebly distinguished from science by the nature 
of its origin, of its subject matter, and of its reception. It does 
not spring from a set of natural laws with which science can 
grapple. M. Lanson's "law"-"Le chef-d'ceuvre est moins un 
commencement, qu'un terme "-infinitely contestable though it is, 
in no way even tries to explain the capital fact of the masterpiece. 
That it becomes a masterpiece at allis not that it was "influenced" 
by a mass of " sources" ; those" sources" existed in the presence 
of every contemporary of the writer, and in the consciousness 
of hundreds. The existence of the "sources" even in the con-
sciousness does not work as a natural law, automatically, to the 
production of masterpieces, though the law has that delightfully 
preposterous implication, and literary scholars seem to believe 
it. That it became a masterpiece at all is due, of course, to the 
spontaneous genius of the writer; its very essence as a master-
piece is the addition which that genius has made upon the inert 
particles which constitute the" sources." And that spontaneous 
genius science has found to lie beyond its scope. Moreover, 
the subject matter of literature is again that same incalculable 
element in men. If the writer is concerned with the scientifically 
calculable elements in humanity he is writing biology, not litera-
ture. His work becomes literature when he is concerned with 
human life as it is lived under the direction of the spontaneous 
elements of the consciousness. And finally in the hands of the 
reader it attains to its rank as a masterpiece by virtue of his 
recognition of its value through its appeal to those same elements 
in his own consciousness. Nowhere, therefore, in its whole 
"life history" does literature, the thing itself, touch even the 
skirts of science. It has its rise, its substance, and its destination 
beyond the scientific pale. 
All this has, it is true, failed explicitly to recognise a distinction 
which would no doubt make the whole difference in the mind of 
the scientifio scholar. What this difference is we may see by a 
scrutiny of the present academic situation. Though our literary 
faculties are dominated by what kas, with perhaps justifiable 
petulance, been called the philological syndicate, there are tol-
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erated on every faculty two or three representatives of another 
type of mind. These men are concerned with literature itself 
as distinguished from philology and literary history, and in 
literature itself they are concerned with its resthetic and emo-
tional values. In this way there is established what is commonly 
called a "balance"; for it is believed that the" artistic side" of 
literature must not be ignored. The establishment of this 
"balance," however, is curiously indicative of the attitude of the 
accredited scholar. Apparently, to him, being himself romantic 
in his attitude to life, literature itself is purely" artistic," purely 
resthetic and emotional; and those whom he provides to take care 
of literature itself seem aware of only those romantic values. 
For his own part he has, as is well known, a tolerant contempt 
for the emotionalists. And in truth he may well have such a 
contempt. There is something weak and effeminate in the culti-
vation of the sensibilities for their own sakes, which a person of 
intellect cannot but scorn. He himself devotes his energies to 
more intellectual tasks. He is a philologist or a historian of 
literature, and as such feels himself to be concerned with matters 
of genuine import and masculine worthiness. This balance 
which he has established, however, is indicative of his conception 
of what literature is, the thing itself, what is its worth, and what 
is its proper treatment. 
It is the failure to have recognised that the scientific literary 
scholar is not really concerned with literature itself that will 
make the distinction of the foregoing section seem unjust and 
somewhat beside the point. And indeed literary history must 
rank as of high importance. The production of a masterpiece 
as an historic event stands eminent among the occurrenc~s of 
the past. It were fatuous to slight the importance of the his-
torian's work, and to slight the importance in this connection of 
the scholarly virtues that are called scientific. They are import-
ant here though in a less degree, just as they are important in 
the field of society and political history, and in the same way. 
But it is hard to escape the sense that they are important because 
they establish with accuracy the circumstances that surround 
the occurrence of something that is in itself important. Their 
service is subordinate to the significance of the fact that they 
establish. 
What the historian may find of the circumstances that pre-
ceded and surrounded the production of Hamlet surely gain 
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their point from the greatness of Hamlet. And what is the 
greatness of IIamlet? Why search so patiently for the 
"sources," for that ur-Ramlet that is so ardently believed in 
-for all the links in the chain of revenge-plays that eventuated 
so gloriously? Suppose they were all found, what then? The 
question is not hard to answer from the humane point of view, 
but for the scientific scholar it is disconcerting. The practical 
answer would be to go on to something else. But such an answer, 
though the one that is made, is something of an evasion. If all 
that scholarship could hope to know were known, what would be 
the point of knowing it? What is Hamlet that all this pother 
of research should go on about it? The syndics have put them-
selves in a way to make it hard for them to reply. They have 
indicated their sense of the significance of literature by the type 
of men they have put on their faculties to deal with the thing 
itself; and they have indicated their attitude to the thing itself 
by their scholarly contempt for the activities of these men. It 
is, we might say, a little inconsistent to act on the belief that the 
production of a piece of literature is momentous enough to war-
rant the existence of a whole body of historical scholars, but to 
believe at the same time that literature itself is a mere matter 
of pleasurable emotions, of an effeminate titillation of the sensi-
Bilities, and unworthy the serious occupation of earnest men of 
intellect. Yet such is, in effect, the attitude of scientific literary 
scholarship to-day. 
Row wholly the modern official literary scholar has, in his 
eagerness to be scientific, effectively denied the existence of all 
scholarly values except those that inhere in the establishment 
of facts is shown perhaps nowhere so strikingly as in the modern 
concern for Medirevalliterature. That most of the matter dug 
out of that dark period is intrinsically worthless is well known. 
But the circumstances of its production, its Quellen, are notably 
obscure. To find an old play or tale or poem which men had 
willingly let die; to trace its "origin", after the analogy of the 
biological sciences, in its resemblances to other plays and tales 
and poems; to hunt down parallels in contemporary and ante-
cedent literature; to range as possible sources and influences a 
nicely graded list of works the author, if he is known, had read 
or might have read, men he had known or might have known, 
conversations he had held or m~ght have held-such is the activ-
ity of those to whom the establishment of facts is the sufficient 
THE INTRUSIONS OF SCIENCE 71 
exercise of literary scholarship. It is all done with an earnest 
solemnity that apparently asks no disconcerting questions; never 
ventures to lift an inquiring eye from the details in the foreground; 
never, in the flush of its accepted success, has come to murmur 
the cui bono of disillusion. To its protagonists the facts are 
sufficient-the things to be worked with, the things to be worked 
for. 
Were we concerned to understand this curious activity, so 
vigorous, so ceaseless, so unmorbid in its freedom from wearying 
thought, this busyness over things so obscure, so worthless, we 
might see, in this ignoring on principle of the spontaneous and 
the incalculable in the human spirit, the decline of the very 
judgment by which in the reader the better and the worse are 
intuitively recognised. Once such a decline is complete the 
critical judgment is overthrown and whatever has attained to 
the external form of literature becomes worthy of treatment by 
the scientific mode of thought; for the element of fact is as large 
in the worse as in the better. However we may explain it, the 
spectacle remains of an indiscriminately vigorous activity over 
literary products whose only importance lies in the opportunity 
which they afford for that activity itself. 
The particular result of the official half-truth that the dis-
covery of "sources" and facts is the sufficient exercise of literary 
scholarship has been to elevate the ethics of the drudge into the 
law of the masters. It has been to do nothing for those rare 
spirits who have in them the germ of the master; it has been to 
sacrifice the best for the many, to proclaim as the fair shining 
body of truth the shoe latchet which those many can indeed be 
taught to unloose. The more general result has been to cultivate 
a generation of literary scholars who take their place beside the 
historians of the scientific school, beside the sociologists, and 
beside the natural scientists, and who with those others at their 
side search for more and ever more details to wonder at. I t is 
to encourage a forgetfulness of the fact that the details, even the 
perfected, unified spectacle itself, has no significance save in its 
relation to that larger synthesis which takes place in the human 
consciousness. It is to forget that the enrichment of that con-
sciousness is the only conceivable end of all their preoccupation. 
It is to complete the circle of those who ignore in that synthesis 
the supreme significance of an element that makes even that 
scholarship possible-personality, the spontaneous play of the 
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reason, the genius of the individual. And more than all, because 
literature is the field wherein that genius which they ignore is the 
sole actor, it confirms those others of the closed circle in their 
predisposed sense that that genius, that personality, is, like the 
romantic sentimentality to which they have thrown a contemp-
tuous sop, but a trivial accident of the human situation. It 
leaves uncontradicted in the place where contradiction would 
most logically appear, the impression that gazing at the facts is 
the end of intellectual activity, and leaves unbroken the moment 
of intoxicated self-forgetfulness in the wonder at the objective 
. accumulation. 
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